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Executive Summary 
The Community Reinvestment Act obligates federally insured depository institutions to 
meet the credit needs of low and moderate income communities in a manner that is 
commensurate with sound lending practices.  The CRA itself is fairly successful, but with the rise 
of non-bank lenders and subprime loan products, it has become apparent that the CRA needs 
to be revised to include regulations that govern independent mortgage lenders.  This will make 
it easier to track and object to predatory lending practices in low and moderate income 
neighborhoods. 
Four federal regulatory agencies monitor banks and conduct periodic examinations to 
assess how well banks are meeting the credit needs of low to moderate income communities.  
In order to enforce the CRA, advocates can object in writing to a bank’s proposed merger with 
another bank or to a proposed bank branch closing in a particular neighborhood.  Regulators 
can deny a bank’s application to merge or alter its branch activity based on the bank’s CRA 
score.   
CRA advocates can also work proactively with banks and local government to maximize 
the impact of CRA-related community development lending.  While some other cities take a 
centralized approach to cultivating CRA lending, in Buffalo, CRA advocacy is scattered amongst 
various organizations and neighborhoods.  By combining efforts across neighborhood 
boundaries, Buffalo’s non-profit housing advocacy organizations could create a coalition to 
better leverage public and private dollars, including local government Community Development 
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Block Grant funds.  This would make CRA projects more attractive to banks by removing some 
of the associated risks and barriers to CRA lending. 
I.  The Community Reinvestment Act 
 
The Community Reinvestment Acti statement of purpose says, simply: 
 
a.  The Congress finds that-- 
 
1.  regulated financial institutions are required by law to demonstrate that their 
deposit facilities serve the convenience and needs of the communities in which 
they are chartered to do business;  
 
2 . the convenience and needs of communities include the need for credit 
services as well as deposit services; and  
 
3.  regulated financial institutions have continuing and affirmative obligation to 
help meet the credit needs of the local communities in which they are chartered.  
 
b.  It is the purpose of this chapter to require each appropriate Federal financial 
supervisory agency to use its authority when examining financial institutions, to 
encourage such institutions to help meet the credit needs of the local 
communities in which they are chartered consistent with the safe and sound 
operation of such institutions. 
 
The Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) was enacted by Congress in 1977 to combat redlining, 
the practice of taking deposits from low-income communities but not lending to those same 
communities.ii  Compliance with the Act is enforced by a federal regulation and covered lending 
institutions are graded on a scale of, “Outstanding,” “Satisfactory,” “Needs to Improve,” or 
“Substantial Non-Compliance.”iii  Regulators look at thirteen criteria in evaluating lenders, 
including, “Extent of lending in the bank’s service area;  service area description;  geographic 
distribution of the bank’s loans;  branch services, openings and closings;  evidence of 
discrimination and illegal credit practices; practices intended to discourage credit applications; 
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participation in community development projects; the bank’s ability to meet community credit 
needs; other relevant factors.”iv 
 Typically, banks fulfill their CRA obligation to “meet community credit needs” by offering 
such retail consumer products as home mortgages, small business loans, construction loans for 
affordable housing projects, and individual development account matched savings programs.  
Banks can also provide support for homebuyer financial education programsv or participate in 
loan pooling and the purchase of affordable housing tax credits in various low to moderate 
income housing projects.vi  Banks may fulfill CRA obligations by providing grant support to 
agencies that engage in this work and technical assistance, such as serving on non-profit 
organization boards.vii 
There are four different regulatory agencies that perform the CRA examinations.  The 
Federal Reserve regulates state-chartered banks that are members of the Federal Reserve 
System and bank holding companies.  The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation regulates 
insured state banks that are not members of the Federal Reserve System.  The Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency regulates national banks.  Finally, the Office of Thrift Supervision 
regulates FDIC-insured savings and loans.viii 
There are different CRA evaluation criteria for different types of banks.  Generally, there 
are four categories of banks that are subject to the CRA requirements.  They are:   
I.  Large Banks 
Institutions with assets greater than $1.03 billion are classified as “large banks.”  They are 
subject to a three-part test, with each part being weighted and contributing to an overall score: 
ix 
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 1.  Lending test – the percentage of loans made to low- and moderate-income 
individuals/communities. 
 2.  Investment test – the number and type of investments made in low- to moderate- 
income areas.  This can include grants to community organizations working in low- to 
moderate-income areas, as well as investing directly in projects and financial education 
programs. 
 3.  Services test – the number and type of services made available to low/mod income 
communities, including branch openings and closings, product availability, financial education, 
and technical support local organizations. 
II.  Intermediate Small Banks 
Intermediate Small Banks have assets ranging between $258 million and $1.03 billion.  They are 
subject to two different tests, both of which they must pass:x 
1.  Small Bank Lending test -  1) “Reasonable” loan-to-deposit ratio;  2)  Percentage of 
loans in the bank’s assessment area;  3)  Distribution of loans to individuals/businesses/farms of 
different income levels and sizes;  4)  Record of responses to written complaints about its 
lending practices;  5)  Geographic distribution of loans. 
 2.  Community Development test –  the amount and responsiveness of community 
development lending, investment and services. 
III.  Small Banks 
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Institutions with assets below $258 million are considered “Small Banks” for the purposes of 
the CRA examination.  Small banks are graded on the Small Bank Lending test outlined above, 
but not the Community Development test.xi 
IV.  Wholesale or Limited Purpose Banks 
“A wholesale bank is a bank that is not in the business of extending home mortgage, small 
business, small farm or consumer loans to retail customers.  A limited purpose bank is a bank 
that offers only a narrow product line to a regional market or broader market.”xii  These banks 
are evaluated based on their community development loans, investments or services;  their 
innovativeness and complexity;  and the bank’s responsiveness to community development 
needs.xiii  
The CRA has come under fire recently from some who argue that it was a cause of the 
subprime mortgage meltdown.xiv  However, in an analysis of the 2006 Home Mortgage 
Disclosure Act data from the fifteen largest Metropolitan Statistical Areas in the United States, 
Warren Traiger reaches the opposite conclusion – that rather than being encouraged to engage 
in risky behavior by the Community Reinvestment Act, the CRA banks, defined as “banks 
originating loans in their…CRA assessment areas,”xv “were substantially less likely than other 
lenders to make the kind of risky home purchase loans that helped fuel the foreclosure crisis.”xvi  
Traiger also concludes that “CRA banks were more than twice as likely as other lenders to retain 
originated loans in their portfolio;  and ... [f]oreclosure rates were lower in MSAs with greater 
concentrations of bank branches.”xvii   
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These findings are particularly relevant to CRA advocacy efforts.  In 2007, Federal 
Reserve Chairman Bernanke noted that “originators who sell loans may have less incentive to 
undertake careful underwriting than if they kept the loans.  Moreover, for some originators, 
fees tied to loan volume made loan sales a higher priority than loan quality.”xviii  Because banks 
are invested in serving those neighborhoods where they are physically located, they are more 
likely to pay attention to the quality of loans they offer and, as a result, make fewer loans that 
are destined to foreclose.xix  Thus, since the CRA actually encourages banks to open more 
branches in low-income neighborhoods, it does not logically follow that the CRA encouraged 
the risky lending in those neighborhoods.  Rather, the CRA had the opposite effect – regulated 
banks kept more of their original loans, and thus had more incentive to see that those loans 
were sound.  The CRA thus acts as a disincentive to risky lending in low-income neighborhoods.  
Furthermore, if foreclosures are lowest in areas with the highest concentration of bank 
branches, communities have good reason to object to bank branch closings in their 
neighborhoods.xx  In terms of advocacy, this information would allow community groups to 
focus their efforts on the idea that partnering with banks is mutually beneficial, not merely 
government mandated. 
This is not to say, however, that the CRA is beyond reproach (just that it is not the cause 
of the subprime lending crisis).  For instance, there is a legitimate question of policy regarding 
how well the CRA exam criteria actually challenge banks to live up to the stated goals of the 
CRA itself.  As of 2007, 98.4% of all regulated banks passed their CRA exams, up from 90% in 
1990.xxi  Meanwhile, 21% of American households remain “unbanked” – that is, they have no 
ongoing relationship with bank services of any kind – and bank branch concentration remains 
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higher in low-density suburban areas than in higher-density urban areas.xxii  This alone is 
evidence that there is a disconnect between the obligations of banks under the Community 
Reinvestment Act, the way regulators examine these banks, and the needs of citizens in low 
and moderate-income communities.  In one particularly egregious example of this disconnect, 
in 2006, the Department of Justice prosecuted Old Kent Bank for violations of the Fair Housing 
Act and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act.  The Dept. of Justice alleged that Old Kent bank 
completely excluded the City of Detroit from its lending area.  The bank had eighteen branches 
in the predominantly white Detroit suburbs, but no branches located within the predominantly 
black City of Detroit proper.  Despite this, the Federal Reserve gave the bank a passing CRA 
score and approved its branch location and expansion activities.xxiii   
This situation is a good example of how examiners have significant discretion within the 
evaluation criteria.  On top of that, banks can define their own assessment areas based on a 
“reasonableness” standard.  CRA examiners can evaluate those self-imposed boundaries, 
however, and correct them if they choose.xxiv  But there is enough room in the evaluation 
system to allow something like the Old Kent Bank scenario to happen.  Of even more concern 
are the many less flagrant examples of similar disinvestment tactics remain under the radar 
where regulators use their discretion to allow banks to comply with their obligations under the 
law while not truly fulfilling the spirit of the CRA. 
Furthermore, in 2000, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act allowed financial institutions to 
merge with insurance companies, security lenders, and mortgage underwriting companies 
without amending the CRA to include this new lending activity.  Because of this, loans offered 
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by bank-affiliated mortgage companies are not subject to CRA requirements.xxv  Even when 
changes are proposed, they often fail to adequately address the depth and scope of the 
problem of predatory lending.xxvi 
II.  National Problem, Local Advocacy 
A.  Local Banks and CRA Requirements 
 Locally, most banks fare well on their CRA exams, regardless of the regulatory institution 
that conducts the exam.  For example: 
1.  Federal Reserve:xxvii 
a.  M&T – Outstanding;  May 12, 2008.xxviii 
 
b.  HSBC – Outstanding;  February 24, 2003.xxix 
2.  Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation:xxx 
a.  Greater Buffalo Savings Bank – Outstanding;  July 1, 2007.xxxi 
 b.  Bank of Akron – Satisfactory;  August 3, 2009.xxxii 
3.  Office of the Comptroller of the Currency:xxxiii 
 a.  Evans National Bank – Satisfactory;  June 12, 2006.xxxiv 
4.  Office of Thrift Supervision:xxxv 
 a.  First Niagara – Satisfactory;  March 12, 2007xxxvi 
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In another example of the “disconnect” between CRA theory and practice, Deutsche Bank (not 
a local bank), despite its activities in the City of Buffalo, received a score of “Outstanding” from 
the Federal Reserve on December 1, 2008.xxxvii  Deutsche Bank was tested under the 
“Wholesale/Limited Purpose” exam method.xxxviii  So, though Deutsche Bank is currently being 
sued for abandoning properties in under-capitalized, blighted neighborhoods in the City of 
Buffalo, its CRA scores are “outstanding.”  This could be because they have moved the 
mortgages they hold to a subsidiary that is not subject to CRA requirements, or simply because 
their actions in contributing to blight are not a factor in CRA evaluations.  Deutsche Bank may 
very well do what is it required to do under the CRA.  They may do good things with their 
community development dollars elsewhere.  But, their actions in Buffalo are directly contrary to 
the purpose and intent of the CRA.  In fact, the HUD Neighborhood Stabilization Program would 
allow the bank to donate these foreclosed houses to community groups that do property 
acquisition and rehabilitation for rehab and resale to low to moderate income homebuyers , 
contributing to the bank’s CRA score. xxxix   But, of course, since Deutsche already has the best 
score possible, it has no incentive to take the titles to any of the houses and then donate them 
to non-profits.  However, the CRA could be used against Deutsche simply by pointing out, in a 
letter to the bank and/or regulators, the blighting influence the bank is having within the City of 
Buffalo.  That would make the issue a matter of public record to be considered next time the 
bank’s CRA activity is examined. 
B.  Local Advocacy 
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A recent study by the Western New York Law Center concluded that, while there have 
been some general Community Reinvestment Act activities going on in Western New York, 
there is a lack of forceful, sustainable CRA advocacy in our community.  More specifically, the 
report cited the high rate of predatory loans in the Western New York market combined with a 
lack of:  1)  a comprehensive reinvestment plan on the part of local municipalities;  2) 
coordination of bank resources, information and education among local non-profits and 
advocacy groups;  and 3) creative financing strategies, such as loan pools, for community 
development projects.xl  However, when organizations work together to support CRA 
objectives, the results in Buffalo are clearly positive.  For instance, Michael Clarke, executive 
Director of Local Initiatives Support Corporation – Buffalo, points to HomeFront, which counsels 
low-and moderate-income home buyers and partners with local banks and the City of Buffalo to 
help low-and-moderate income families purchase homes.xli  Of the one-thousand families who 
purchased homes with the assistance of HomeFront, only seven of them ended up in 
foreclosure as of November 1, 2008. 
So, with evidence of programs that do create effective partnerships, why doesn’t 
Buffalo have more CRA advocacy?  Perhaps one factor is the limited presence of the Federal 
Reserve Bank in Buffalo.  The New York Federal Reserve, serving New York state, northern New 
Jersey, and Fairfax County, CT, on the other hand, is focused primarily on Wall Street and the 
securities markets.  A search for “Buffalo” within the content of the New York Reserve website 
reveals only one substantive article – announcing the closing of the Buffalo branch office.xlii  By 
comparison, the 2nd District, with headquarters in Cleveland, Pittsburgh, and Cincinnati, serving 
Ohio, western Pennsylvania, northern panhandle of West Virginia, and eastern Kentucky, has a 
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website that provides a wealth of information about the region, the economy, and community 
development.   
So, while the Cleveland Reserve has branch offices in areas decimated by foreclosure 
and is focused on dealing with the foreclosure problems in northern Ohio, the New York 
Reserve has little more than an “Advisory Board” that represents all of “upstate” New York.xliii  
The fact that the New York Federal Reserve branch serves predominantly the New York metro 
area means that regulators are surrounded on a daily basis not by foreclosed, vacant houses, 
but rather by the same bankers who eschewed quality for volume in loan sales. 
 But there are groups in Buffalo who are acutely aware of the issues and who are 
advocating for CRA reform.  Recently, the local community group PUSH (People United for 
Sustainable Housing) sponsored a meeting with Federal Reserve officials to give them a better 
idea of the real impact of their policies in Buffalo’s neighborhoods.  The comments from 
citizens and community groups in attendance largely agreed that CRA and Home Mortgage 
Disclosure Act reforms, in addition to better oversight by the Federal Reserve, are needed in 
order to extend more credit to underserved communities and keep more people in their homes 
in Buffalo.xliv  According to Kathleen Lynch, senior attorney at the Western New York Law 
Center, “the current regulatory structure is inadequate to detect or prevent a problem.”xlv  The 
CRA only applies to federally insured depository institutions.  Lenders who are not subject to 
any CRA obligations can engage in predatory lending practices without the data collection and 
analysis imposed on banks by the CRA.  HDMA Data from 2006 indicates that only 10% of all 
loans are CRA-related, while 34% of all loans are to low and moderate-income borrowers.  24% 
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of low- and moderate-income borrowers are therefore served either by independent mortgage 
lenders or banks lending outside of their self-imposed assessment areas.xlvi  Thus, the CRA and 
HMDA must be expanded to include all lenders.  That would allow advocacy groups to get 
access to more accurate information regarding the types of loans that are being extended in 
their communities.xlvii 
 In addition to advocating for change in the regulations local groups can create 
partnerships with banks to increase the flow of capital to underserved areas.  According to Joan 
Dallis, VP of Community Development at HSBC Bank, banks are looking for partnerships that 
can maximize leverage to satisfy the bank’s CRA obligations and more.xlviii  While the CRA can be 
used to bring banks to the table, it is important to keep in mind that banks also have the power 
to convene.xlix  Approaching a bank in the spirit of partnership could prove to be very fruitful, as 
the bank can use its status to bring municipalities to the bargaining table.  The bank has an 
opportunity to not only fulfill CRA obligations, but also create new customers predominantly 
through mortgage and small business lending.  Expanding its customer base is good business for 
the bank, so clearly well-designed CRA-related projects can be mutually beneficial for all parties 
involved.   While banks are legally obligated to lend in all areas in which they take deposits, 
municipalities can help banks to identify projects where they can maximum the impact of their 
discretionary community development spending.l  When the municipality articulates a vision 
and strategy for achieving community development goals, this can act as a guide for banks and 
a risk mitigating factor.li 
III.  Examples of Programs from Other Cities 
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One such mutually beneficial public-private partnership is the Greater Rochester 
Housing Partnership (GRHP), a non-profit that deals primarily in construction loans.  GRHP runs 
a program called Home Rochester, which distributes pooled money for rehabilitation and sale 
of city homes: 
HOME Rochester is financed through a unique consortium of for-profit and non-profit lenders. 
Under the leadership of JP Morgan Chase, a total of $57,000,000 has been made available to the 
RHDFC for purchasing and renovating single family homes. The current $16,000,000 participation 
loan consists of lenders with investments ranging from $500,000 to $3,000,000. The lenders are: 
JP Morgan Chase, HSBC, Citizens Bank, M&T Bank, Key Bank, City of Rochester, Enterprise 
Community Partners, Greater Rochester Housing Partnership and the United Way of Greater 
Rochester.lii 
 
Banks get CRA credit for buying into the loan pool.  The banks are able to provide mortgages for 
the purchasers of these homes as well.  According to Jean Lowe, Executive Director of GRHP, 
this model works because there is a centralized administrative structure.  The City is fully 
supportive of the organization and it provides reserve funds, which makes banks comfortable.  
The City of Rochester’s Focused Investment Strategy also helps to alleviate fears that 
investments in riskier areas will fare poorly.  By lending its support to a comprehensive strategy, 
the City is able to guide the banks, within the requirements and boundaries of the CRA, into 
what would otherwise look like risky investment areas.liii  Syracuse, NY has a similar, centralized 
organization called Home Headquarters.liv 
In San Diego, CA, the city and county governments partnered to create the San Diego 
City-County Reinvestment Task Force.lv  This public-private, intergovernmental approach allows 
the group to adapt based on the needs of the various communities where CRA-related lending 
issues arise.  The Task Force, made up of local government officials, bank representatives, non-
profits and even “public members”, convenes regularly to analyze trends in the San Diego 
housing market, discuss strategies for creation of new low- and moderate income housing, and 
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track impacts of existing projects.lvi  If nothing else, this proactive partnership shows that cities 
and counties can and should work together to solve problems, since disinvestment and 
foreclosure are regional problems, not just stereotypical “urban” problems.  This type of 
proactive, collaborative approach could very well encourage risk-averse banks by assuring them 
that the CRA-related programs they are buying into will be fully supported by local government 
officials. 
Buffalo has many organizations working on housing and community development-
related functions.  HomeFront, Belmont Shelter, Heart of the City Neighborhoods, Inc., 
Fillmore-Leroy Area Residents, Inc., PUSH Buffalo and West Side Neighborhood Housing 
Services, among others, all serve low to moderate income communities and implement home 
ownership initiatives within the city of Buffalo.  Most of these groups have programs that 
address homeownership counseling and financial education for homebuyers, and some do new 
construction of affordable housing and/or rehab and repair of existing units. 
However, there are advantages to the collaborative, more unified models used in 
Rochester, Syracuse and elsewhere.  For instance, due to delays in city processes, HomeFront, 
along with fifty other service-providing organizations in Buffalo, has been without city funding 
for months and the organization is in limbo with regards to its city contract.lvii  Both HomeFront 
and the Lt. Matt Urban Human Services Center, which also provides housing services, have 
consistently received high productivity ratings in city evaluations.lviii  While it remains unclear 
why these contracts have not been renewed, the larger picture shows that it is precisely this 
type of uncertainty that makes banks wary of risk.  This is even more problematic given the fact 
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that several banks provide support to HomeFront.  Mr. Dossinger of M&T Bank sits on its board 
of directors.lix  So, there is a productive relationship between the banks and the non-profit that 
is unsupported by local government efforts.  When viewed over the long-term, this is bad for all 
housing and community development organizations, not just HomeFront.  The city comes 
across as unstable in these instances.  So, regardless of who gets money from where, the 
process seems unpredictable.  That is not the type of environment that would make any bank 
comfortable investing money, especially in the already-risky arena of low-income housing 
acquisition and rehab.  Home Rochester, while a creation of government, operates 
independently so it can avoid the risks that are inherent in the political process. 
Furthermore, the ad hoc approach to CRA advocacy could result in divisions and 
disagreements between organizations within the same area regarding how to best use CRA 
lending to improve the community.  This may not cause banks to be wary of lending to any 
particular project, but in the long run in such discord could result in a project becoming 
unprofitable for lack of broader community support.  Or, at the very least, the appearance of 
discord within a community could further the perception that lending within that community is 
risky. 
 If east side and west side housing advocacy groups combined efforts in pushing for 
community development lending, the nature of this coalition could eliminate some of the risks 
associated with CRA projects.lx  Combining efforts would increase organizational capacity to 
acquire, rehab, hold and sell properties.  It would also allow for the identification of strategic 
demand areas throughout the city of Buffalo.  Once a few key areas are identified by a diverse 
group of neighborhood leaders, ways to connect these areas can be discussed so the city will be 
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able to build upon successful efforts with further investment.  Finally, such a coalition could 
more easily leverage federal Community Development Block Grant funding from local 
government officials, since the benefits of the lending activity would be felt throughout Buffalo.  
Neighborhoods in need would not have to compete with one another for investment dollars.   
Furthermore, such efforts could focus on transit-accessible projects near major 
transportation nodes and commercial corridors, thereby building on existing investments such 
as ArtSpace lofts and Amherst Station.  Utica Street, for instance, is a hub that connects a major 
east-west bus route to the subway.  Investment in housing improvements for low and 
moderate income residents near Utica and Main would allow residents to access public 
transportation options that conveniently connect to almost all parts of the city and beyond.  
That type of reinvestment effectively adds value to the project by reducing low- and moderate-
income residents’ dependence on automobile travel for employment and services.  By viewing 
Main Street as a permeable boundary (or, perhaps not a boundary at all), organizations on 
opposite sides of Buffalo could find common ground.  In doing so, ideally, they could also 
leverage more resources in pursuit of a building a city that creates value and builds wealth for 
all of its residents. 
IV.  CRA Strategies 
 Effective CRA advocacy takes two general forms.  The first is the form of “watchdog” 
where the advocate monitors publically available CRA data, using that information to track 
trends in lending and advocate for more bank involvement in particular communities. lxi  This is 
necessary to make sure that banks are living up to their CRA requirements, including the “spirit” 
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of the act, and that there are no outright violations.  Or, if there are, they are quickly called to 
the attention of regulators. 
 The watchdog role can also involve watching the regulators to ensure that they are 
using their discretion appropriately and that when they give passing grades, those grades are 
warranted by the available data.  Simply keeping tabs on and analyzing this data may sound dull 
and excessively time-consuming, but banks are required by law to keep these comments on 
their CRA activity as a matter of public record.lxii  Regulators, then, must by law consider these 
comments when evaluating the bank.  So, the CRA does reward the diligent watchdog. 
 The watchdog role can also involve legislative advocacy.  Keeping in mind that the 
subprime bubble was not caused by the CRA but was rather a result of the CRA not being 
inclusive enough, it is important to advocate for a stronger CRA that includes more types of 
lenders.  This will allow for collection of more accurate data about subprime lending.  It could 
potentially also prevent the Deutsche Bank scenario, where a national lender is allowed to 
literally walk away from and increase blight in low income communities while still getting 
“outstanding” CRA ratings. 
 The second strategy adopts a collaborative form – create a coalition of housing and 
community development organizations to work with the banks, ideally with participation from 
local government, but even if it is initially lacking.  This type of collaboration would command 
attention thanks to the CRA, thereby bringing the banks, large and small, as well as other 
financial intermediaries, to the table.  The financial institutions, then, could bring local 
governments to the table to help work out a comprehensive CRA strategy. 
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